[redacted]

1-6-0958

1 October 1954

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[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

Hanson Baldwin called me at four o'clock from the Airport and I asked him what he could tell me about this statement Admiral Carney is supposed to have made in a speech that there is a Russian cruiser operating in the Far East. Baldwin said he got his idea by implication from a speech Carney is making today in Texas. He said it is a very guarded statement and does not specifically say that a Sverdlov type cruiser is operating in the Pacific but does state that we know of their building one; that it is a fine ship and can operate in the Atlantic and Pacific. Later on in the speech Carney mentions building facilities but does not say they are for a cruiser but the implication that Baldwin got is that they are for a cruiser and exist so as to make possible an Arctic crossing from the Atlantic to the Pacific. He said that this was the first mention by Carney of a Sverdlov cruiser in which he mentions the Pacific.

Hanson got his information from an advance copy of Carney's speech and he made his own interpretation by implication.

Attached hereto is a copy of the Carney speech.

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[redacted]

STANLEY J. GROGAN

Enclosure
of basic memo
Copy to Mr. Amory. (less speech)

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
Washington 25, D. C.

PLEASE NOTE DATE

NO. 914-54

HOLD FOR RELEASE
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ADDRESS BY
ADMIRAL ROBT. B. CARNEY, U.S.N., CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
BEFORE THE ROSE FESTIVAL
TYLER, TEXAS
FRIDAY, 1 OCTOBER 1954 - 12:00 NOON (CST) - 1:00 P.M. (EST)

Not being a native of Texas, and never having served aboard her namesake ship, I never could quite understand why I have always held such an affinity for the battleship TEXAS. Then, a few days ago, I discovered the answer: Both she and I were launched into the Navy on the same year and that was 42 years ago. Of course, the fact that the TEXAS and I fought and survived two major wars together gives me a close bond with one of America's most distinguished men-o'-war.

But there is much more to the relationship between Texas and the Navy than the material components of a single naval unit. Actually the battleship TEXAS which is now enshrined at the San Jacinto battle ground graphically symbolizes the great human effort which has been made by Texans in the defense of our ideals and liberties. I am thinking of Texans who have worked in our factories and shipyards, Texans who volunteered enough war bond purchases not only to build the new cruiser HOUSTON after her gallant predecessor had been lost in the Java Sea, but they provided enough cash on the same occasion to build the aircraft carrier SAN JACINTO as well. I am thinking of the many Texans' sons who have served in our Armed Forces, soldiers, airmen and sailors, sailors of every rate and rank--from seaman to fleet admiral.

The acts of courage and patriotism and the boundless spirit of Texans have become legend in the brief span of our nation's history and I am particularly happy to be here in Tyler on the occasion of the Rose Festival; it offers me the opportunity to pin a well-deserved rose on the people of this Lone Star State.

Knowing the keen interest that is always evinced by Texans in our government, in our way of life, in our armed forces, and because of the interest that is currently being shown by Congressional and other governmental actions, it seemed that this occasion would provide both area and audience to discuss military strength as a most important instrument of national policy.

The exact shape of such military strength, as always, involves some divergent opinions and there are numerous schools of thought on this subject. This problem does not lend itself to any exact mathematical solution, but a study of the major factors does point up certain fundamental conclusions which enable us to decide with a measure of confidence some general specifications for the scope and character of our military defenses.

Without belaboring the point, the conclusions of the best brains which we have been able to put to work on the subject have decided that greater offensive and defensive strength in the air is essential; but they also know full well that

the day of the foot-slogging soldier is not over by any means, and they have decided that it would be folly to relinquish the advantage which we hold at sea. In short, those responsible for our national safety have come to the conclusion that the air, sea and ground components are all absolutely essential members of the defense team.

Our people are too alert to the potentialities and dangers in the air above us to require any reminder here of the importance of air power. Perhaps they need some enlightenment concerning the importance of a hard-hitting and mobile Army, but that is a subject better discussed by my comrades in the Army. I, for one, do not share the view that there is a lack of appreciation in our country of the importance of sea power; I have abundant evidence, in the whole-hearted support of the government and the Congress that the American people instinctively feel the need for maintaining a strong posture on the seven seas. However, there are some tremendously interesting facts concerning this business of sea power which the people are entitled to know, and which they will find intensely interesting--not just old cliches or dull statistics.

By V-J Day we had swept our Axis enemies from the seas. The undersea vipers of Germany had been whipped and whipped properly. The day of infamy--7th of December 1941--had been avenged by the final strikes on the remnants of the Japanese Fleet in their own home waters in the summer of 1945 leaving nothing but hulks to be discussed at the peace table. That was a day of triumph for American sea power but the sweet taste of triumph all too quickly turned to ashes, because almost immediately the Navy found itself under attack by our own people; even our Sister Services questioned the further need for a strong Navy with the German and Japanese Fleets wiped out.

We, who know the business of controlling the seas, knew that there was a continuing need, but it was uphill arguing. We knew that even with no threat from the Japanese Navy, it had taken a terrific maritime effort to land the Army and the Marines on Okinawa and maintain them there in the face of desperate air attack. Fortunately, the days of those divergencies have come and gone. Today, the situation is far too obvious to the informed to leave any room for doubt that we have a problem on our hands to remain sufficiently strong at sea to take care of the maritime aspects of our national security. For replacing the Japanese and German threats of other days, we are now confronted with a new challenge on the surface of the seas, beneath their surface, and in the air above them.

With amazing speed Russia is emerging from her land-locked situation and today must be counted as a nation of great maritime potential. This fact is having a profound effect upon our own thinking for the future; and today, I would like to tell you something about maritime Russia and lay before you some of the factors which will govern our own naval thinking and decisions in the decade that lies ahead of us.

First, and foremost, before going into a purely naval discussion, it is necessary to think for a moment about the world we live in and about the mentality and capabilities of those who might threaten us.

Early in 1946, I made a statement that it was my considered belief that we would never be able to come to any agreement with international communism in any area, philosophically or geographically, because the very essence of communist

[illegible] the fomenting and maintaining of disagreement and confusion. Eight years later that conclusion is not only valid, but every man and woman in the United States must realize that it has been documented to our sorrow. We know the objectives of international communism and no intelligent person could believe otherwise than that they will move in the direction of their objectives any time they figure that they have sufficient strength to insure success.

Nor are we dealing with the bovine mujik of song and story. Again, to our sorrow, we have badly underestimated the mental and production capabilities of this new Russia. They have learned many lessons and one of them, very obviously, is the lesson of sea power. They have obviously come to understand the bitter part that the sea played in Germany's defeat, and Japan's.

Now these things add up to a smart, relentless and swiftly progressing nation which knows it must have a Navy in furtherance of its plans and objectives, and which is producing a powerful sea force at a rate which would never have been dreamed possible a few years ago. True, Russia lacks the seagoing tradition; and skilled sea fighters cannot be cranked out overnight; but we said that there were other things which they could not accomplish for years to come which they nevertheless accomplished; so I, for one, have no intention of being lulled into any smug sense of superiority.

Now just exactly what are these people doing by way of building a Navy?

A major navy is a tremendously complex weapons-system involving many types of complicated craft and the highly skilled and disciplined personnel to man them and to operate technical equipment. Its leaders must be versed in all of the aspects of several types of sea operations and campaigns. And the country behind the navy must have the industrial facilities and know-how in degree and quantity necessary to produce and support a fleet. What goes on behind the Iron Curtain is surrounded by the best cloak of secrecy that the Soviets can devise and enforce. Nevertheless, certain things have been observed and many facts have been deduced from the bits and pieces of information that are picked up and pieced together.

We know that Russia is developing a great shipbuilding capacity, and we also know that she orders merchant ship construction from other countries so that she may utilize her own capabilities in this field for producing military ships. We know that she has busy shipyards in the Baltic and the Black Sea and--this is most interesting--in the Pacific. We know that she has concentrations of ships--fleets--in the Murmansk area, in the Baltic, in the Black Sea and in the waters adjacent to Manchuria and Siberia.

A glance at the map shows that while her Baltic and Black Sea fleets are partially strangled, her forces in the Barents Sea and in the Western Pacific now have access to the open seas.

We also know something concerning Russia's shipbuilding program. We know that she is building first-class cruisers of the SVERDLOV class and her efforts in this particular category exceed all of the cruiser building in the world. These new cruisers of hers are fine seagoing ships capable of extended operations. They have a high-seas capability, and they are beginning to try it out in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

We also know that she is building large and seaworthy destroyers with characteristics that make them the equal of those that fly the flags of the allied nations.

We know that she has large numbers of submarines capable of extended operations far from her own shores and we know that she has embarked upon a submarine program which deserves the world's closest attention.

Nor have they overlooked the necessity for the utilization of aviation in maritime operations. As far as I know, they have no aircraft carriers but I do know that they have taken a leaf from the book of the American Navy and have incorporated air units into the naval commands.

Despite the secrecy thrown around all Soviet activities, it has been possible to obtain glimpses of what goes on in some of the Russian fleets. For example, we know that in the Siberian and Manchurian waters, they are continually carrying out exercises developing team-work between surface ships, aircraft, and submarines. It would be ridiculous to conclude otherwise than that such maneuvers are for the purpose of developing both offensive and defensive tactics and techniques. When one considers that the Soviets may have as many as one hundred submarines in Pacific waters, and when one pauses to reflect on the utter dependence of our own Far Eastern forces, and our allies in the Far East, on a great concentration of tonnage on the sea lanes, it will be readily apparent that we no longer have a monopoly on strength at sea in the Pacific. True, these Soviet naval forces have not been tested in the crucible of combat and do not have the vast background of experience that our own Navy has; nevertheless, in the hands of resolute and fast-progressing people, the Soviet maritime strength already constitutes a challenge which can not be ignored.

There is something special about this naval challenge that deserves our closest attention and study. It concerns the matter of how the Soviet admirals are planning to fight their ships and planes and it is still an open question. Will they seek to dominate vast ocean areas or merely to dominate portions of it as needed? A high-ranking and highly regarded Soviet admiral has recently written that "The experience of World War II teaches that the solution to problems of naval warfare demand the attainment of mastery of the seas; but the path of this attainment lies not through general victory by fleet or blocade of enemy fleets; mastery of the sea now is attained by conducting a series of consistent operations, the successful execution of which, all brings about the incapacitation of enemy sea power.

"Mastery of the seas is necessary to a fleet, first of all, in a limited area of a theatre, for a limited time, for the solution of a given problem. The method of solution includes, as well as the destruction of the enemy fleet at sea, the capture of his bases and airdromes and often the entire shore area of a limited sea theatre."

That, of course, is his view--a theory that has not been tested and one which would not serve the needs of the United States and her allies. Although we cannot be sure that this Russian admiral has provided us with the blueprint of the Soviets' future naval strategy, there is good indication that the Soviet Union is building the type of a navy that would seek to deny us use of certain vital sea areas.

The naval lessons from the Korean War would seem to substantiate this pattern of Russian thinking. They initiated an intensive mining effort in the Wonsan and Chinnampo harbors when the Chinese communists were entering that conflict. Although our side dominated both the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, the movement of our troops and supplies was threatened by the mine hazard at a critical time.

Certainly we can not assume that the Soviets will overlook any possibilities with regard to utilizing the maritime power which they are determinedly building.

Perhaps the strangest aspect of this ever-widening air age in which we are living is that rather than the air lessening the strategic importance of the sea, actually the truth is that air power has made the sea more important than ever. For air power has increased the load on our maritime forces; increased the requirements of our nation for overseas bases as well as raw materials, many of which must be brought in from overseas. Most of the world's commerce, as in the past, is still seaborne; nor is there any anticipated change in this situation for the foreseeable future. The vast bulk of the supplies transported in time of war must be moved by sea. The sea is still the main highway between allies when it comes to the transport of the millions of tons of commodities which must be moved and exchanged to keep alive the economies of the countries of the world. As long as this holds true, control of the sea for our own uses and its denial to any enemy will remain a vital factor in security and defense.

At the end of World War II, the United States possessed an armada which far exceeded the combined naval strength of all of the rest of the world. We were in the position of the poker player who had won all the chips; the ultimate in maritime supremacy had been achieved. Then, naturally, the United States, maritime-wise, settled back into a naval routine of experimenting, researching, developing new ideas and models, but doing virtually nothing toward replacing and modernizing the post-war inventory. As long as we could enjoy our unchallenged supremacy, there was nothing wrong with this approach--nor was there really any justification in embarking on an extensive, new and costly shipbuilding program. Nor did there seem to be any serious challenge to our maritime position. It seemed logical to concentrate on research and development with a comfortable sense of security that our World War II ships provided more than a reasonable guarantee of safety at sea for the time being.

That was eight years ago. Now, another page of history has been turned and we are confronted with a new set of conditions.

We can not much longer complacently count on our aging ships to insure retention of this great asset which we now hold: Supremacy at sea. Not only is time catching up with those gallant old ships just in the matter of age, new weapons of offense and defense have been developed--both here and abroad--and once more the flag of a strong and unfriendly power is appearing on the seas.

These things make it imperative for the United States to proceed systematically with a modernization of its fleet which will bring in a steady flow of new and modern ships, designed and built from the beginning, to make use of the things which science has produced in the last decade.

Please do not misunderstand me: Your country has not been unaware of these needs in recent years and the Congress has already made generous provision for some new construction and for the modernizing of some of our older ships. Actually,

erican fleet has already begun and a substantial start has been made. We are constructing new carriers, modern from the keel up. We are converting older carriers to accommodate the new in aircraft, in weapons, and in defense. The launching of the NAUTILUS opened the door of a completely new era in maritime history and we are already engaged in producing more nuclear-powered submarines. Scores of our older destroyers have been modernized to deal with the submarine threat. And many other alterations and innovations have been initiated to improve the characteristics of the ships of our fleet, large and small.

I am concerned with the situation concerning our destroyers and escort types. They are virtually all the same age and they will all become obsolescent at about the same time--"bloc obsolescence" we call this phenomenon. The day that they become passe' would be an extremely serious day for our country if an adequate replacement program were not underway.

We thoroughly recognize the great gravity of the submarine threat and I wish that I could take the time to tell you of the worry and concern and the tremendous effort that has been made by the Navy to develop equipment and techniques that will successfully meet this threat. After years of discouraging efforts, I feel that we are at last cracking that barrier and there is every reason to be encouraged. We have made an exhaustive study of the types of destroyers and escort ships that will be needed, together with studies of characteristics and weapons; and we are now prepared to ask the country for authority to proceed with the building of replacements, certain that the ships for which we are asking will do the job.

The business of planning the Fleet of the future requires laborious and painstaking studies and research but there are exciting implications, too. Never in the history of seagoing, so it seems to me, have there ever been the exciting and stimulating opportunities which exists today. I profoundly envy the young sailor who is beginning his naval career; before him lies a vista of unrestricted scope, offering unlimited play to imagination, challenging the best that his mind and body can offer; and with the possibility of rapid change that is nothing short of kaleidoscopic. I know that there will still be the dreary night watches to be stood; I realize that there still will be the annoying little chores which must be performed if a ship is to stay afloat and its gear to be ready when needed; I don't think for a minute that we can get away from the absences and separations that have always characterized navy life. But when I see the uncanny production of power from a curious little mass of radio active material, when I see guided missiles unerringly search out and destroy an attacking plane, when I think of the breath-taking potentialities of a nuclear-powered fleet, and realize that the electronic wizards are helping us to solve problems beyond the capabilities of the most brilliant human mind, I feel that there is something electric in the air about the Navy; and I envy the people who are young enough to participate in the exciting years that lie just ahead.

This business of planning the fleet of the future, as I said, involves a lot of laborious study but there are certain factors which can be understood by the layman--factors in which the layman would be interested. The composition of this fleet of the future depends upon two fundamental factors: The tasks which we know we will originate in support of our own positive national strategic policies and objectives; and the tasks which will be imposed upon us by an enemy's aims and his capabilities. It is pretty hard to estimate the other fellow's intent, but if we know something of the elements of his strength, we can do a little figuring--and pretty good figuring--as to his capabilities; and with certain sound conclusions as to his capabilities, we can proceed to develop counter-measures to cope with them.

(MORE)

take the submarine threat--the nightmare which haunted us in the last two wars and which today may be even of greater significance. To offset such a threat, we can do several things. We can destroy the threat at its source--which means offensive operations. We can intercept the threat en-route to its target--which involves detecting him and attacking him before he reaches his objective; and we have a very clear idea as to what sort of forces and equipment we need for this type of operation. We must be prepared to repell attack should the enemy succeed in putting himself in attacking position--this aspect of the problem calls for close protection of the ports and convoys and we have definite ideas as to how this should be done and what sort of forces are required to do it. This single example points up the need for striking forces, hunter-killer forces, and convoy escorts; and a further study gives us a very good indication as to what would be needed in terms of numbers to do these jobs. This is only one facet of the maritime aspects of the international struggle; in like manner, we can make determination of our needs in such areas as the amphibious field, in mine warfare, and in aerial reconnaissance.

Now, also, the Navy has a definite job to do in defense of the Continental United States and we must contribute to the vital need for early warning and interception of threatening planes or missiles. For this task, specially configured ships and aircraft are needed and we are providing them.

And so it goes.

We have definite plans of our own and we can calculate the things we need to accomplish those jobs. We size up the strength of potential unfriendly powers, calculate how they might employ that strength in different ways, and endeavor to provide ships and weapons and equipment which will enable us successfully to counter the threat. And thus, we arrive at conclusions as to our maritime needs.

But that is not quite all. We must estimate what sort of forces that must be kept in being at all times in order to weather a surprise attack; we must estimate the ships and men to be kept in reserve so that we could mobilize swiftly and effectively, and we can do some figuring as to what industry would have to further produce for us to make an all-out effort.

The sum total of these cogitations manifests itself in the sort of active fleet which we maintain, the nature of our reserve fleet and reserve stocks, and the request that we make upon the Congress each year for new construction, for new aircraft, and for the modernizing of those things which we already have.

Today, we must continually review our thinking, as we watch the progress of the Soviets in their new salt-water adventure; for instance, not very long ago, fishing vessels and other ships reported a very sizable force of some fifteen ships proceeding from the Murmansk to the Baltic. Apparently there were three cruisers, five seagoing destroyers, and some seven other craft of various sorts. That is a very respectable force and its appearance on the high seas, flying Russia's flag, could not be but a matter of tremendous interest. When one considers that there is very good reason to believe that Russia is embarked on a building program which is capable of producing a total strength of 30 cruisers, 150 destroyers, and 500 seagoing submarines within the next two or three years, it is very apparent that we must energetically prosecute a dynamic program of our own for keeping the United States Fleet powerful and modern.

 ese things, not with any thought of creating alarm, but rather for the purpose of keeping this extremely important matter in the forefront of American thinking and insuring that the facts are understood. Actually, the Congress has been making provision for new construction and modernizations which are already doing much to put the finest possible tools in the hands of those who must defend the nation at sea. Furthermore, although we keep a watchful eye on the burgeoning of this other new power at sea, and although we have no intention of underestimating Soviet ingenuity and energy, we are still confident that we can successfully discharge our responsibilities to our country. With the help of brilliant American scientists and a resourceful industry, and with the support of the American people, there will be a steady flow of the newest weapons and newest equipment into the fleet, and as the years go by, the best of the builders' arts will be added. The younger officers in the Navy will serve to see the day when atomic-powered ships and submarines are commonplace, when detection devices outrange anything that we know today, and when missiles will strike down threatening forces before they even heave into sight.

History is repeating itself and hence conclusions are again being vindicated. In this swiftly changing era of ours--in this age of brilliant air achievement in supersonic flight--mastery of the seas is still a vital factor in security and world influence; and sea power will long continue to exert a powerful influence on history. Perhaps its influence will be the greater, because, now it not only has its own traditional chores to do, but new and difficult responsibilities have been added in the requirements for closer cooperation with and in support of our Sister Services.

Although it is important to keep the people abreast of what new things are emerging in the maritime world, I realize that it is hardly necessary to tell the people of this State the meaning of sea power. After all, was it not the Texas Navy's denial of the Gulf of Mexico's sea lanes to Santa Ana that forced him overland and contributed so much to a Texas victory? Three of those ships in the Texas Navy were named LIBERTY, INDEPENDENCE and INVINCIBLE; and there is a special significance in those names today, as much as at any time in history. If we are to retain our liberties and independence, we must retain our sea invincibility.

E-N-D